Secure nested codes for type II wiretap channels

Ruoheng Liu, Yingbin Liang, H. Vincent Poor, Predrag Spasojević

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

84 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of secure coding design for a type II wiretap channel, where the main channel is noiseless and the eavesdropper channel is a general binary-input symmetric-output memoryless channel. The proposed secure error-correcting code has a nested code structure. Two secure nested coding schemes are studied for a type II Gaussian wiretap channel. The nesting is based on cosets of a good code sequence for the first scheme and on cosets of the dual of a good code sequence for the second scheme. In each case, the corresponding achievable rate-equivocation pair is derived based on the threshold behavior of good code sequences. The two secure coding schemes together establish an achievable rate-equivocation region, which almost covers the secrecy capacity-equivocation region in this case study. The proposed secure coding scheme is extended to a type II binary symmetric wiretap channel. A new achievable perfect secrecy rate, which improves upon the previously reported result by Thangaraj et al., is derived for this channel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2007 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2007, Proceedings
Pages337-342
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event2007 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2007 - Lake Tahoe, CA, United States
Duration: Sep 2 2007Sep 6 2007

Publication series

Name2007 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2007, Proceedings

Other

Other2007 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2007
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLake Tahoe, CA
Period9/2/079/6/07

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Information Systems
  • Information Systems and Management

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