Secure lossless compression with side information

Deniz Gündüz, Elza Erkip, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

Secure data compression in the presence of side information at both a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper is explored. A noise-free, limited rate link between the source and the receiver, whose output can be perfectly observed by the eavesdropper, is assumed. As opposed to the wiretap channel model, in which secure communication can be established by exploiting the noise in the channel, here the existence of side information at the receiver is used. Both coded and uncoded side information are considered. In the coded side information scenario, inner and outer bounds on the compression-equivocation rate region are given. In the uncoded side information scenario, the availability of the legitimate receiver's and the eavesdropper's side information at the encoder is considered, and the compression-equivocation rate region is characterized for these cases. It is shown that the side information at the encoder can increase the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper. Hence, the side information at the encoder is shown to be useful in terms of security; this is in contrast with the pure lossless data compression case where side information at the encoder would not help.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2008 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW
Pages169-173
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event2008 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW - Porto, Portugal
Duration: May 5 2008May 9 2008

Publication series

Name2008 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW

Other

Other2008 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW
CountryPortugal
CityPorto
Period5/5/085/9/08

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Information Systems
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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