Secrecy Rate Optimization for Secure Multicast Communications

Recently, physical layer security has been recognized as a new design paradigm to provide security in wireless networks. In contrast to the existing conventional cryptographic methods, physical layer security exploits the dynamics of fading channels to enhance security of wireless communications. This paper studies optimization frameworks for a multicasting network in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to a group of legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In particular, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems are investigated for a multicasting secrecy network. First, the power minimization problem is solved for different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. Next, the secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated with the help of private jammers to improve the achievable secrecy rates through a game theoretic approach. These jammers charge the transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference caused to the eavesdroppers. For a fixed interference price scenario, a closed-form solution for the optimal interference requirement to maximize the revenue of the transmitter is derived. This rate maximization problem for a nonfixed interference price scenario is formulated as a Stackelberg game in which the jammers and transmitter are the leaders and follower, respectively. For the proposed game, a Stackelberg equilibrium is derived to maximize the revenues of both the transmitter and the private jammers. To support the derived theoretical results, simulation results are provided with different numbers of legitimate users and eavesdroppers. In addition, these results show that physical layer security based jamming schemes could be incorporated in emerging and future wireless networks to enhance the quality of secure communications.