Secrecy is cheap if the adversary must reconstruct

Curt Schieler, Paul Cuff

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

A secret key can be used to conceal information from an eavesdropper during communication, as in Shannon's cipher system. Most theoretical guarantees of secrecy require the secret key space to grow exponentially with the length of communication. Here we show that when an eavesdropper attempts to reconstruct an information sequence, as posed in the literature by Yamamoto, very little secret key is required to effect unconditionally maximal distortion; specifically, we only need the secret key space to increase unboundedly, growing arbitrarily slowly with the blocklength. As a corollary, even with a secret key of constant size we can still cause the adversary arbitrarily close to maximal distortion, regardless of the length of the information sequence.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings, ISIT 2012
Pages66-70
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 22 2012
Event2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2012 - Cambridge, MA, United States
Duration: Jul 1 2012Jul 6 2012

Publication series

NameIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings

Other

Other2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2012
CountryUnited States
CityCambridge, MA
Period7/1/127/6/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Applied Mathematics

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    Schieler, C., & Cuff, P. (2012). Secrecy is cheap if the adversary must reconstruct. In 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings, ISIT 2012 (pp. 66-70). [6284287] (IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings). https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2012.6284287