Secgraph: A uniform and open-source evaluation system for graph data anonymization and de-anonymization

Shouling Ji, Weiqing Li, Prateek Mittal, Xin Hu, Raheem Beyah

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

94 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze and systematize the state-of-the-art graph data privacy and utility techniques. Specifically, we propose and develop SecGraph (available at [1]), a uniform and open-source Secure Graph data sharing/publishing system. In SecGraph, we systematically study, implement, and evaluate 11 graph data anonymization algorithms, 19 data utility metrics, and 15 modern Structure-based De-Anonymization (SDA) attacks. To the best of our knowledge, SecGraph is the first such system that enables data owners to anonymize data by state-of-the-art anonymization techniques, measure the data’s utility, and evaluate the data’s vulnerability against modern De-Anonymization (DA) attacks. In addition, SecGraph enables researchers to conduct fair analysis and evaluation of existing and newly developed anonymization/DA techniques. Leveraging SecGraph, we conduct extensive experiments to systematically evaluate the existing graph data anonymization and DA techniques. The results demonstrate that (i) most anonymization schemes can partially or conditionally preserve most graph utilities while losing some application utility; (ii) no DA attack is optimum in all scenarios. The DA performance depends on several factors, e.g., similarity between anonymized and auxiliary data, graph density, and DA heuristics; and (iii) all the state-of-the-art anonymization schemes are vulnerable to several or all of the modern SDA attacks. The degree of vulnerability of each anonymization scheme depends on how much and which data utility it preserves.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages303-318
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9781931971232
StatePublished - 2015
Event24th USENIX Security Symposium - Washington, United States
Duration: Aug 12 2015Aug 14 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium

Conference

Conference24th USENIX Security Symposium
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityWashington
Period8/12/158/14/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

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