TY - GEN
T1 - Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning of Partially Observable Markov Games
AU - Liu, Qinghua
AU - Szepesvári, Csaba
AU - Jin, Chi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Neural information processing systems foundation. All rights reserved.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - This paper considers the challenging tasks of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) under partial observability, where each agent only sees her own individual observations and actions that reveal incomplete information about the underlying state of system. This paper studies these tasks under the general model of multiplayer general-sum Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs), which is significantly larger than the standard model of Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). We identify a rich subclass of POMGs-weakly revealing POMGs-in which sample-efficient learning is tractable. In the self-play setting, we prove that a simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is sufficient to find approximate Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, as well as coarse correlated equilibria of weakly revealing POMGs, in a polynomial number of samples when the number of agents is small. In the setting of playing against adversarial opponents, we show that a variant of our optimistic MLE algorithm is capable of achieving sublinear regret when being compared against the optimal maximin policies. To our best knowledge, this work provides the first line of sample-efficient results for learning POMGs.
AB - This paper considers the challenging tasks of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) under partial observability, where each agent only sees her own individual observations and actions that reveal incomplete information about the underlying state of system. This paper studies these tasks under the general model of multiplayer general-sum Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs), which is significantly larger than the standard model of Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). We identify a rich subclass of POMGs-weakly revealing POMGs-in which sample-efficient learning is tractable. In the self-play setting, we prove that a simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is sufficient to find approximate Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, as well as coarse correlated equilibria of weakly revealing POMGs, in a polynomial number of samples when the number of agents is small. In the setting of playing against adversarial opponents, we show that a variant of our optimistic MLE algorithm is capable of achieving sublinear regret when being compared against the optimal maximin policies. To our best knowledge, this work provides the first line of sample-efficient results for learning POMGs.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85163179771
T3 - Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
BT - Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35 - 36th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NeurIPS 2022
A2 - Koyejo, S.
A2 - Mohamed, S.
A2 - Agarwal, A.
A2 - Belgrave, D.
A2 - Cho, K.
A2 - Oh, A.
PB - Neural information processing systems foundation
T2 - 36th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NeurIPS 2022
Y2 - 28 November 2022 through 9 December 2022
ER -