Robust rationalizability under almost common certainty of payoffs

Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi, Olivier Tercieux

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable. We also investigate how permissive robust rationalizability becomes if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)57-67
Number of pages11
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume63
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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