Robust implementation in general mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001

Robust implementation in general mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann
, Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	261-281
Number of pages	21
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	71
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001
State	Published - Mar 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Common knowledge
Dominant strategies
Implementation
Interim equilibrium
Mechanism design
Robustness

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10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001

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title = "Robust implementation in general mechanisms",

abstract = "A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.",

keywords = "Common knowledge, Dominant strategies, Implementation, Interim equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robustness",

author = "Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris",

note = "Funding Information: ✩ This research is supported by NSF Grants \#CNS-0428422 and \#SES-0518929. We thank Matthew Jackson, the co-editor, Andrew Postlewaite and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper supersedes and incorporates results reported earlier in Bergemann and Morris (2005). Through our joint authorship of Bergemann et al. (2010) and detailed comments on this draft, Olivier Tercieux has greatly improved this version, including suggesting a strengthening of Theorem 1 and the treatment of responsive social choice functions in Section 6.1. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Bergemann), [email protected] (S. Morris). 1 We typically refer to “interim” equilibria rather than “Bayesian” equilibria in light of the fact that the type space may not have a common prior.",

year = "2011",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "71",

pages = "261--281",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

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AU - Bergemann, Dirk

AU - Morris, Stephen

N1 - Funding Information: ✩ This research is supported by NSF Grants #CNS-0428422 and #SES-0518929. We thank Matthew Jackson, the co-editor, Andrew Postlewaite and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper supersedes and incorporates results reported earlier in Bergemann and Morris (2005). Through our joint authorship of Bergemann et al. (2010) and detailed comments on this draft, Olivier Tercieux has greatly improved this version, including suggesting a strengthening of Theorem 1 and the treatment of responsive social choice functions in Section 6.1. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Bergemann), [email protected] (S. Morris). 1 We typically refer to “interim” equilibria rather than “Bayesian” equilibria in light of the fact that the type space may not have a common prior.

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N2 - A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

AB - A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

KW - Common knowledge

KW - Dominant strategies

KW - Implementation

KW - Interim equilibrium

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Robustness

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/79951953839

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/79951953839#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:79951953839

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 71

SP - 261

EP - 281

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

Robust implementation in general mechanisms

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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