@article{5a83ba4193b14e5382005e761741fd84,
title = "Robust implementation in general mechanisms",
abstract = "A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.",
keywords = "Common knowledge, Dominant strategies, Implementation, Interim equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robustness",
author = "Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris",
note = "Funding Information: ✩ This research is supported by NSF Grants #CNS-0428422 and #SES-0518929. We thank Matthew Jackson, the co-editor, Andrew Postlewaite and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper supersedes and incorporates results reported earlier in Bergemann and Morris (2005). Through our joint authorship of Bergemann et al. (2010) and detailed comments on this draft, Olivier Tercieux has greatly improved this version, including suggesting a strengthening of Theorem 1 and the treatment of responsive social choice functions in Section 6.1. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses:
[email protected] (D. Bergemann),
[email protected] (S. Morris). 1 We typically refer to “interim” equilibria rather than “Bayesian” equilibria in light of the fact that the type space may not have a common prior.",
year = "2011",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.001",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "71",
pages = "261--281",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}