Robust implementation in general mechanisms

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)261-281
Number of pages21
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume71
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Common knowledge
  • Dominant strategies
  • Implementation
  • Interim equilibrium
  • Mechanism design
  • Robustness

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