TY - GEN
T1 - RMDM
T2 - 2023 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2023
AU - Hassan, Fahid
AU - Shaikhanov, Zhambyl
AU - Guerboukha, Hichem
AU - Mittleman, Daniel M.
AU - Sengupta, Kaushik
AU - Knightly, Edward W.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 IEEE.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In this paper, we propose RMDM, Random Meta-atoms enabled Directional Misinformation, a novel system that enables a wireless transmitter to program a transmissive metasurface to send misinformation towards eavesdroppers while ensuring the correct information is received at the legitimate receiver. To do so, we design a metasurface with angular-dependent channel responses that alter the phase and amplitude of the transmitted symbol in different ways along different angular directions. We show how randomly selected groups of meta-atoms can be reconfigured so that the symbol constellation in the eavesdropper's direction is randomly transformed for each symbol. Moreover, our design includes a baseband correction, prior to transmission, to eliminate the metasurface's impact in the intended user's direction. Our experimental results show that the eavesdropper's error probability increases to almost 0.5 after an angular separation of only 4° away from the legitimate user's direction, forcing the eavesdropper to be very close to correctly intercept the information.
AB - In this paper, we propose RMDM, Random Meta-atoms enabled Directional Misinformation, a novel system that enables a wireless transmitter to program a transmissive metasurface to send misinformation towards eavesdroppers while ensuring the correct information is received at the legitimate receiver. To do so, we design a metasurface with angular-dependent channel responses that alter the phase and amplitude of the transmitted symbol in different ways along different angular directions. We show how randomly selected groups of meta-atoms can be reconfigured so that the symbol constellation in the eavesdropper's direction is randomly transformed for each symbol. Moreover, our design includes a baseband correction, prior to transmission, to eliminate the metasurface's impact in the intended user's direction. Our experimental results show that the eavesdropper's error probability increases to almost 0.5 after an angular separation of only 4° away from the legitimate user's direction, forcing the eavesdropper to be very close to correctly intercept the information.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85177551631&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85177551631&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CNS59707.2023.10288796
DO - 10.1109/CNS59707.2023.10288796
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85177551631
T3 - 2023 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2023
BT - 2023 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2023
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 2 October 2023 through 5 October 2023
ER -