TY - GEN
T1 - Revenue sharing among ISPs in two-sided markets
AU - Wu, Yuan
AU - Kim, Hongseok
AU - Hande, Prashanth H.
AU - Chiang, Mung
AU - Tsang, Danny H.K.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - In this paper, we study the revenue sharing and rate allocation for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that jointly provide network connectivity between content providers and end-users. Without colluding, each ISP may selfishly set a high transit-price to cover its cost and maximize its own profit, which inevitably results in a loss in social profit. We model this noncooperative interaction between an "eyeball" ISP and a content ISP as a Stackelberg game and quantify the resulting loss in social profit. To recover the profit loss, we propose a revenue sharing contract between ISPs by modeling them as a supply chain to deliver traffic in a two-sided market. Parameterized by the profit division factor, the sharing contract coordinates ISPs' objectives such that they aim to maximize the social profit self-incentively. We further propose a Nash bargaining process to determine the profit division factor such that all ISPs are simultaneously better off compared to the noncooperative equilibrium.
AB - In this paper, we study the revenue sharing and rate allocation for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that jointly provide network connectivity between content providers and end-users. Without colluding, each ISP may selfishly set a high transit-price to cover its cost and maximize its own profit, which inevitably results in a loss in social profit. We model this noncooperative interaction between an "eyeball" ISP and a content ISP as a Stackelberg game and quantify the resulting loss in social profit. To recover the profit loss, we propose a revenue sharing contract between ISPs by modeling them as a supply chain to deliver traffic in a two-sided market. Parameterized by the profit division factor, the sharing contract coordinates ISPs' objectives such that they aim to maximize the social profit self-incentively. We further propose a Nash bargaining process to determine the profit division factor such that all ISPs are simultaneously better off compared to the noncooperative equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79960878844&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79960878844&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935234
DO - 10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935234
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79960878844
SN - 9781424499212
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
SP - 596
EP - 600
BT - 2011 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM
T2 - IEEE INFOCOM 2011
Y2 - 10 April 2011 through 15 April 2011
ER -