Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis

Walter Bossert, Marc Fleurbaey, Dirk Van De Gaer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines how the first-best models of compensation based on the agents' talents and responsibilities analyzed in some recent contributions can be extended to a second-best context. A few social criteria are proposed and compared to alternative approaches by Roemer and Van de gaer.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)35-55
Number of pages21
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Keywords

  • Compensation
  • Opportunities
  • Optimal tax
  • Second-best

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