TY - JOUR
T1 - Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
AU - Mailath, George J.
AU - Morris, Stephen
N1 - Funding Information:
1This is a substantial revision of ‘‘Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.’’ That paper was written while Mailath was visiting the Australian National University and Morris was visiting Northwestern University: we thank both institutions for their hospitality. We thank Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, and two referees for helpful comments. Mailath gratefully acknowledges financial support from NSF Grant SBR-9810693 and Morris gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and NSF Grant SBR-9896328.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior, and thus support cooperative outcomes, but with private monitoring, such coordination may no longer be possible. Even though grim trigger is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring, it often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces an equilibrium in all close-by games with private monitoring. This implies a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-public almost-perfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
AB - In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior, and thus support cooperative outcomes, but with private monitoring, such coordination may no longer be possible. Even though grim trigger is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring, it often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces an equilibrium in all close-by games with private monitoring. This implies a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-public almost-perfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2869
DO - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2869
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036169628
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 102
SP - 189
EP - 228
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -