Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states

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Abstract

The famous theorem of R. Aumann and M. Maschler states that the sequence of values of an N-stage zero-sum game ΓN(ρ) with incomplete information on one side and prior distribution ρ converges as N→∞, and that the error term err[ΓN(ρ)]=val[ΓN(ρ)]-lim M→∞val[ΓM(ρ)] is bounded by CN-½ if the set of states K is finite. The paper deals with the case of infinite K. It turns out that, if the prior distribution ρ is countably-supported and has heavy tails, then the error term can be of the order of Nα with α∈-½,0, i.e., the convergence can be anomalously slow. The maximal possible α for a given ρ is determined in terms of entropy-like family of functionals. Our approach is based on the well-known connection between the behavior of the maximal variation of measure-valued martingales and asymptotic properties of repeated games with incomplete information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)767-789
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume43
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 10 2014
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Keywords

  • Bayesian learning
  • Entropy
  • Error term
  • Maximal variation of martingales
  • Repeated games with incomplete information

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