Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey

Atsushi Kajii, Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a “canonical” way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple “complete theory” interpretation (Kreps in Game theory and economic modelling. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the “higher-order beliefs literature” (Rubinstein in Am Econ Rev 79:385–391, 1989; Monderer and Samet in Games Econ Behav 1:170–190, 1989; Morris et al. in Econ J Econ Soc 63:145–157, 1995; Kajii and Morris in Econ J Econ Soc 65:1283–1309, 1997a) and the “payoff uncertainty approach” (Fudenberg et al. in J Econ Theory 44:354–380, 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg in J Econ Theory 52:243–267, 1990).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)7-34
Number of pages28
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume71
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Higher order beliefs
  • Incomplete information
  • Refinements
  • Robustness

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this