Redistributive Politics under Spatial Inequality

Most research on redistributive politics has neglected the spatial concentration of rising inequality and its consequences on political preferences and electoral politics. In this article, I argue that the geographic distribution of inequality undermines the political logic of redistribution when elections are held under plurality rule. When inequality in the median electoral district is lower than in the nation as a whole, demand for redistributive policies and voting for left-leaning parties is concentrated in a few districts. This limits the legislative power left parties can amass while disincentivizing left parties from offering proredistributive platforms. I provide empirical evidence to support my argument using cross-national data on regional inequalities, local-level administrative and geocoded survey data from the United Kingdom, and comparative manifesto data. The findings offer a new explanation of why rising inequality has not led to more redistribution, which suggests that political geography can weaken political responses to inequality and electoral representation.