Abstract
In a model where individual incomes depend on the agents' characteristics, we provide characterizations of several redistribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed to eliminate the effects of characteristics that are to be considered "irrelevant", while preserving the influence of "relevant" characteristics on individual incomes. The mechanisms discussed here are egalitarian-equivalent and conditionally egalitarian mechanisms, as well as averaging versions of these rules.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 343-355 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1996 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics