Reasons and Rationality: The Case of Group Agents

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Abstract

John Broome has argued that there are distinct requirements of rationality and reason. Niko Kolodny has defended an error theory about requirements of rationality, arguing that requirements of rationality fall out of the requirements of reason, not in the straightforward sense that one has a reason to be rational as such, but in the sense that requirements of rationality are a byproduct of requirements of reason. Recent work in the theory of group agency and the problem of judgment aggregation raises a difficulty for applying Kolodny's error theory to the case of requirements of group rationality and group reason. This chapter explores ways in which the conflict between the proposed error theory in the group case and the results concerning judgment aggregation might be resolved. The chapter also considers what bearing the group case has on the success of the error theory in the individual case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationWeighing and Reasoning
Subtitle of host publicationThemes from the Philosophy of John Broome
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191765223
ISBN (Print)9780199684908
DOIs
StatePublished - May 21 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities

Keywords

  • Group agency
  • John Broome
  • Judgment aggregation
  • Niko Kolodny
  • Rationality
  • Reason

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