TY - CONF
T1 - RE
T2 - 3rd Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2006
AU - Garriss, Scott
AU - Kaminsky, Michael
AU - Freedman, Michael J.
AU - Karp, Brad
AU - Mazières, David
AU - Yu, Haifeng
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers, their shepherd Dan Rubenstein, Michael Walfish, and Mark Han-dley for their feedback and comments. The authors also extend a special thanks to Michael Puskar and NYU ITS, Robert Johnson, Marc Foster, and Greg Matthews, without whom the data analysis in this paper would not have been possible. Antonio Nicolosi and Benny Pinkas provided valuable help with the cryptography, and Michael Ryan contributed to the code. This work was partially supported by project IRIS under NSF Cooperative Agreement ANI-0225660.
Funding Information:
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers, their shepherd Dan Rubenstein, Michael Walfish, and Mark Handley for their feedback and comments. The authors also extend a special thanks to Michael Puskar and NYU ITS, Robert Johnson, Marc Foster, and Greg Matthews, without whom the data analysis in this paper would not have been possible. Antonio Nicolosi and Benny Pinkas provided valuable help with the cryptography, and Michael Ryan contributed to the code. This work was partially supported by project IRIS under NSF Cooperative Agreement ANI-0225660.
Publisher Copyright:
© NSDI 2006.All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - The explosive growth in unwanted email has prompted the development of techniques for the rejection of email, intended to shield recipients from the onerous task of identifying the legitimate email in their inboxes amid a sea of spam. Unfortunately, widely used content-based filtering systems have converted the spam problem into a false positive one: email has become unreliable. Email acceptance techniques complement rejection ones; they can help prevent false positives by filing email into a user's inbox before it is considered for rejection. Whitelisting, whereby recipients accept email from some set of authorized senders, is one such acceptance technique. We present Reliable Email (RE:), a new whitelisting system that incurs zero false positives among socially connected users. Unlike previous whitelisting systems, which require that whitelists be populated manually, RE: exploits friend-of-friend relationships among email correspondents to populate whitelists automatically. To do so, RE: permits an email's recipient to discover whether other email users have whitelisted the email's sender, while preserving the privacy of users' email contacts with cryptographic private matching techniques. Using real email traces from two sites, we demonstrate that RE: renders a significant fraction of received email reliable. Our evaluation also shows that RE: can prevent up to 88% of the false positives incurred by a widely deployed email rejection system, at modest computational cost.
AB - The explosive growth in unwanted email has prompted the development of techniques for the rejection of email, intended to shield recipients from the onerous task of identifying the legitimate email in their inboxes amid a sea of spam. Unfortunately, widely used content-based filtering systems have converted the spam problem into a false positive one: email has become unreliable. Email acceptance techniques complement rejection ones; they can help prevent false positives by filing email into a user's inbox before it is considered for rejection. Whitelisting, whereby recipients accept email from some set of authorized senders, is one such acceptance technique. We present Reliable Email (RE:), a new whitelisting system that incurs zero false positives among socially connected users. Unlike previous whitelisting systems, which require that whitelists be populated manually, RE: exploits friend-of-friend relationships among email correspondents to populate whitelists automatically. To do so, RE: permits an email's recipient to discover whether other email users have whitelisted the email's sender, while preserving the privacy of users' email contacts with cryptographic private matching techniques. Using real email traces from two sites, we demonstrate that RE: renders a significant fraction of received email reliable. Our evaluation also shows that RE: can prevent up to 88% of the false positives incurred by a widely deployed email rejection system, at modest computational cost.
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M3 - Paper
AN - SCOPUS:80054705061
Y2 - 8 May 2006 through 10 May 2006
ER -