Rationalizable implementation

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Olivier Tercieux

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e. in distinct states it selects distinct outcomes, we show that strict Maskin monotonicity is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1253-1274
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume146
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Complete information
  • Implementation
  • Maskin monotonicity
  • Rationalizability
  • Robust implementation
  • Robust mechanism design

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