TY - GEN
T1 - RAPPOR
T2 - 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2014
AU - Erlingsson, Úlfar
AU - Pihur, Vasyl
AU - Korolova, Aleksandra
PY - 2014/11/3
Y1 - 2014/11/3
N2 - Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response, or RAPPOR, is a technology for crowdsourcing statistics from end-user client software, anonymously, with strong privacy guarantees. In short, RAPPORs allow the forest of client data to be studied, without permitting the possibility of looking at individual trees. By applying randomized response in a novel manner, RAPPOR provides the mechanisms for such collection as well as for efficient, high-utility analysis of the collected data. In particular, RAPPOR permits statistics to be collected on the population of client-side strings with strong privacy guarantees for each client, and without linkability of their reports. This paper describes and motivates RAPPOR, details its differential-privacy and utility guarantees, discusses its practical deployment and properties in the face of different attack models, and, finally, gives results of its application to both synthetic and real-world data. Copyright is held by the authors.
AB - Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response, or RAPPOR, is a technology for crowdsourcing statistics from end-user client software, anonymously, with strong privacy guarantees. In short, RAPPORs allow the forest of client data to be studied, without permitting the possibility of looking at individual trees. By applying randomized response in a novel manner, RAPPOR provides the mechanisms for such collection as well as for efficient, high-utility analysis of the collected data. In particular, RAPPOR permits statistics to be collected on the population of client-side strings with strong privacy guarantees for each client, and without linkability of their reports. This paper describes and motivates RAPPOR, details its differential-privacy and utility guarantees, discusses its practical deployment and properties in the face of different attack models, and, finally, gives results of its application to both synthetic and real-world data. Copyright is held by the authors.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84910685712&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84910685712&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2660267.2660348
DO - 10.1145/2660267.2660348
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84910685712
SN - 9781450329576
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 1054
EP - 1067
BT - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 3 November 2014 through 7 November 2014
ER -