TY - JOUR
T1 - Punishment institutions selected and sustained through voting and learning
AU - Vasconcelos, Vítor V.
AU - Dannenberg, Astrid
AU - Levin, Simon A.
N1 - Funding Information:
V.V.V. acknowledges funds from the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, through the Rapid Switch Initiative. V.V.V. and S.A.L. acknowledge funding from the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (D17AC00005) and National Science Foundation grant GEO-1211972. A.D. acknowledges funding from the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 programme, action ERC-2014-STG, Project HUCO, grant number 636746.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.
PY - 2022/7
Y1 - 2022/7
N2 - In virtually all human societies, the sustained provision of public goods is enforced through punishment. This can happen, for example, via a legal system (formal punishment institutions) or individual-level reciprocity (informal punishment institutions). However, targeting and enforcement of punishment is usually costly, leaving a permanent temptation for individuals to avoid the costs. Here, we show that costly punishment institutions can be adopted through voting and learning but suffer an existential threat if the decision-making process to implement the punishment institution is not aligned with the scale of the public good, creating unavoidable free-riding incentives. We design a model where individuals vote in favour of or against the institution, either with their feet or group vote, to govern public goods at different scales. Learning occurs through the accumulation of one’s experiences and observations of other members in the population, but it may be limited due to memory and information constraints. We show—across scales of the decision-making process and public good—under which conditions punishment institutions are adopted and promote cooperation. Using a meta-study approach, we compare the model to existing experimental results, which largely confirm the key results of the model.
AB - In virtually all human societies, the sustained provision of public goods is enforced through punishment. This can happen, for example, via a legal system (formal punishment institutions) or individual-level reciprocity (informal punishment institutions). However, targeting and enforcement of punishment is usually costly, leaving a permanent temptation for individuals to avoid the costs. Here, we show that costly punishment institutions can be adopted through voting and learning but suffer an existential threat if the decision-making process to implement the punishment institution is not aligned with the scale of the public good, creating unavoidable free-riding incentives. We design a model where individuals vote in favour of or against the institution, either with their feet or group vote, to govern public goods at different scales. Learning occurs through the accumulation of one’s experiences and observations of other members in the population, but it may be limited due to memory and information constraints. We show—across scales of the decision-making process and public good—under which conditions punishment institutions are adopted and promote cooperation. Using a meta-study approach, we compare the model to existing experimental results, which largely confirm the key results of the model.
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U2 - 10.1038/s41893-022-00877-w
DO - 10.1038/s41893-022-00877-w
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85128351367
SN - 2398-9629
VL - 5
SP - 578
EP - 585
JO - Nature Sustainability
JF - Nature Sustainability
IS - 7
ER -