An anti-jamming communication game between a cognitive radio enabled secondary user (SU) and a cognitive radio enabled jammer is considered, in which end-user decision making is modeled using prospect theory (PT). More specifically, the interactions between a user and a smart jammer (i.e., their respective choices of transmission probability) are formulated as a game under the assumption that end-user decision making under uncertainty does not follow the traditional objective assumptions stipulated by expected utility theory (EUT), but rather follows the subjective deviations specified by PT. Under the assumption that the capacity of the system is governed by the primary user activity, the Nash equilibria of the game are characterized under various conditions and the impact of the players' subjectivity (deviation from EUT behavior) on the SU's throughput is measured. Simulation results show that the subjective view of an SU tends to exaggerate the jamming probabilities and decreases its transmission probability, thus reducing the average throughput. On the other hand, the subjectivity of a jammer tends to reduce its jamming probability and thus increases the SU throughput.