Pricing mechanisms for cooperative state estimation

E. V. Belmega, L. Sankar, H. V. Poor, M. Debbah

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

The conflict between cooperation in distributed state estimation and the resulting leakage of private state information (competitive privacy) is studied for an interconnected two regional transmission organizations (RTOs) model of the grid. Using an information theoretic rate-distortion-leakage (RDL) tradeoff model, each RTO communicates at a rate chosen to optimize an objective function that is dependent on two opposing quantities: a rate-distortion based pricing function that encourages cooperation, and a leakage function that impedes it. It is shown that strictly non-zero pricing incentives are required to achieve non-trivial target distortions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012 - Rome, Italy
Duration: May 2 2012May 4 2012

Publication series

Name5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012

Other

Other5th International Symposium on Communications Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2012
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityRome
Period5/2/125/4/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Signal Processing

Keywords

  • Competitive privacy
  • distributed state estimation
  • pricing mechanisms
  • rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff

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