Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and Executive Oversight, 2001-2013

Frances E. Lee

doi:10.1111/psq.12066

Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and Executive Oversight, 2001-2013

Frances E. Lee

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article analyzes the president's leadership predicament in light of purely partisan considerations in Congress, meaning members' interests in winning and holding control of national institutions. I examine congressional votes to raise the debt limit, which are highly dependent upon patterns of institutional party control. I also examine high-profile congressional charges of administration misdoing, another arena in which members of the president's party behave starkly differently from members of the president's opposition. These differences have consequences for presidential leadership, no matter the configuration of party control of national institutions.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	775-791
Number of pages	17
Journal	Presidential Studies Quarterly
Volume	43
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12066
State	Published - Dec 2013
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

History
Sociology and Political Science
Public Administration

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10.1111/psq.12066

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Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and Executive Oversight, 2001-2013

Abstract

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