Presidential vetoes in the early republic: Changing constitutional norms or electoral reform?

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Abstract

Historians, political scientists, and legal scholars have long debated the origins and development of the executive veto in the early United States. Some scholars argue that the power was originally conceived as quite limited. These scholars argue that until Andrew Jackson used the veto against the recharter of the Bank of the United States, the veto was limited to unconstitutional or administratively unworkable legislation. Others argue that no such norms existed and that the veto was always understood as an important legislative power of the president and that early presidents used it as such. I argue that neither account provides an adequate explanation of the development and usage of the veto in the early republic. I claim that early veto usage was quite different, not because of constraining constitutional norms, but because the electoral conditions that generate equilibrium vetoes had yet to emerge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)369-384
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume71
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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