Presidential reputation and the veto

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63 Scopus citations


This paper develops a dynamic model of the bargaining between a legislature and an executive with veto power. The dynamic nature of the model provides the executive with incentives to use the veto as a reputation building device in order to gain more favorable legislative outcomes. The model illustrates that the implicit threat of building a reputation may cause the legislature will be more accommodating in its proposals to the executive. The model illustrates the possibility of a "honeymoon period" of legislative accommodation followed by a decline in the president's influence. This paper also explores ways in which the legislature might mitigate the effects of presidential reputation building.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-26
Number of pages26
JournalEconomics and Politics
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1997
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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