Political Polarization and Compromise in Secession Politics¹

Why do some secession movements lead to violent conflict, others are resolved through policy concessions, while still others end in peaceful separation? Existing theories focused on information asymmetries or commitment problems cannot fully explain this variation in outcomes. We propose a bargaining theory of secession incorporating three critical factors: policy polarization, credible exit, and resource rents. We demonstrate that secessions differ from standard bargaining problems because successful separation creates two independent policy-setting entities. Our analysis reveals that, even with complete information, policy differences alone can trigger conflict when polarization exceeds critical thresholds. Equally important, we identify conditions where peaceful partition becomes rational. The usefulness of this framework is demonstrated through comparative analysis of cases, including Sudan, Czechoslovakia, and Panama. By explaining compromise, peaceful separation, and violent secession within a unified model, this research advances our theoretical understanding of when political unions endure or dissolve.