Political Geography and Firm Strategies: How Electoral Competition Influences Local Job Creation

James Bisbee, Hye Young You

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Among the many promises made by politicians to their constituents, job creation is universal. Do firms strategically use job creation to exert influence? We take this question to the universe of firms in the United States between 1997 and 2018, linking each subsidiary to a congressional district. We find that firms open subsidiaries in more competitive districts, suggesting that firms employ politicians’ constituents as a political strategy to build ties with vulnerable legislators. These patterns are also consistent with electorally insecure politicians exerting more effort to attract firms. Unlike other tools of political influence available to a firm, such as campaign contributions and lobbying, job creation is constrained by geography and time. We show that these patterns exist only for firms in geographically flexible industries, that local job creation increases a politician’s electoral survival, and that subsidiary investments are correlated with longer tenures on valuable congressional committees.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)687-703
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume86
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

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