TY - JOUR
T1 - Physical Layer Security of In-Home PLC Systems
T2 - Analysis Based on a Measurement Campaign
AU - Camponogara, Andrei
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
AU - Ribeiro, Moises Vidal
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received September 27, 2019; revised April 25, 2020; accepted May 27, 2020. Date of publication June 25, 2020; date of current version March 9, 2021. This work was supported in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Finance Code 001), in part by the National Council of Scientific and Technological Development, in part by the Instituto Nacional de Energia Elétrica, in part by the Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais, and in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-0939370 and Grant CCF-1513915. (Corresponding author: Ândrei Camponogara.) Ândrei Camponogara and Moisés Vidal Ribeiro are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora 36036330, Brazil (e-mail: andrei.camponogara@engenharia.ufjf.br; mribeiro@engenharia.ufjf.br).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2007-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - This article investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of a broadband in-home power line communication (PLC) system when a malicious and passive PLC device tries to eavesdrop upon private information sent by a PLC transmitter to a legitimate PLC receiver. In this setting, the ergodic achievable secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput, and wiretap code rates are numerically evaluated with the use of a data set obtained from a measurement campaign carried out in several Brazilian houses. This data set comprises PLC channel estimates and measured additive noises considering four distinct sets of transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper positions. Numerical results, covering three distinct frequency bands (1.7-30 MHz, 1.7-50 MHz, and 1.7-86 MHz), quantitatively show, in practice, the level of vulnerability of broadband in-home PLC systems in terms of PLS and offer some directions for an appropriate design of PLC modems to improve PLS.
AB - This article investigates the physical layer security (PLS) of a broadband in-home power line communication (PLC) system when a malicious and passive PLC device tries to eavesdrop upon private information sent by a PLC transmitter to a legitimate PLC receiver. In this setting, the ergodic achievable secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput, and wiretap code rates are numerically evaluated with the use of a data set obtained from a measurement campaign carried out in several Brazilian houses. This data set comprises PLC channel estimates and measured additive noises considering four distinct sets of transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper positions. Numerical results, covering three distinct frequency bands (1.7-30 MHz, 1.7-50 MHz, and 1.7-86 MHz), quantitatively show, in practice, the level of vulnerability of broadband in-home PLC systems in terms of PLS and offer some directions for an appropriate design of PLC modems to improve PLS.
KW - Physical layer security (PLS)
KW - power line communications (PLC)
KW - secrecy outage probability
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U2 - 10.1109/JSYST.2020.2999487
DO - 10.1109/JSYST.2020.2999487
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85102781861
SN - 1932-8184
VL - 15
SP - 617
EP - 628
JO - IEEE Systems Journal
JF - IEEE Systems Journal
IS - 1
M1 - 9125921
ER -