TY - GEN
T1 - Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality
AU - Dughmi, Shaddin
AU - Niazadeh, Rad
AU - Psomas, Alexandros
AU - Weinberg, S. Matthew
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism design, one which shares conceptual and technical elements with its more mature relative: the burgeoning field of persuasion. The dual perspective permits us to analyze optimal persuasion schemes both in settings which have been analyzed in prior work, as well as for natural generalizations which we are the first to explore in depth. Most notably, we permit combining persuasion policies with payments, which serve to augment the persuasion power of the scheme. In both single and multi-receiver settings, as well as under a variety of constraints on payments, we employ duality to obtain structural insights, as well as tractable and simple characterizations of optimal policies.
AB - Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism design, one which shares conceptual and technical elements with its more mature relative: the burgeoning field of persuasion. The dual perspective permits us to analyze optimal persuasion schemes both in settings which have been analyzed in prior work, as well as for natural generalizations which we are the first to explore in depth. Most notably, we permit combining persuasion policies with payments, which serve to augment the persuasion power of the scheme. In both single and multi-receiver settings, as well as under a variety of constraints on payments, we employ duality to obtain structural insights, as well as tractable and simple characterizations of optimal policies.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85076981482
SN - 9783030353889
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 142
EP - 155
BT - Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, WINE 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Caragiannis, Ioannis
A2 - Mirrokni, Vahab
A2 - Nikolova, Evdokia
PB - Springer
T2 - 15th Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2019
Y2 - 10 December 2019 through 12 December 2019
ER -