TY - JOUR
T1 - Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games
AU - Kajii, Atsushi
AU - Morris, Stephen
N1 - Funding Information:
* Financial support from the Nomura Foundation for Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged. -Financial support from NSF grant 9709601 and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 1998/9
Y1 - 1998/9
N2 - An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distributionμover a type space and payoff functionsu. Probability distributionμ′ isstrategically closetoμif, for any bounded payoff functionsuand any equilibrium of the game (μ,u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (μ′,u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante probability to all events; and (2) with high ex ante probability, it is approximate common knowledge that they assign similarconditionalprobabilities to all events.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.
AB - An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distributionμover a type space and payoff functionsu. Probability distributionμ′ isstrategically closetoμif, for any bounded payoff functionsuand any equilibrium of the game (μ,u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (μ′,u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante probability to all events; and (2) with high ex ante probability, it is approximate common knowledge that they assign similarconditionalprobabilities to all events.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0000216965&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0000216965&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2418
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2418
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0000216965
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 82
SP - 267
EP - 276
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -