TY - JOUR
T1 - Pay, reference points, and police performance
AU - Mas, Alexandre
N1 - Funding Information:
* I am indebted to Orley Ashenfelter and Gordon Dahl for providing the data on arbitration cases. I am also grateful to George Akerlof, David Card, Henry Farber, Alan Krueger, Jonathan Leonard, David Levine, Enrico Moretti, Matthew Rabin, Rebecca Rainof, Cecilia Rouse, Jesse Rothstein, and seminar participants at Humboldt University, Nuffield College, Hebrew University, Universitat Pom-peu Fabra, University of California–Berkeley, University of California–Davis, Stanford Graduate School of Business, London School of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research, and University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, and the Princeton University labor lunch for helpful suggestions. Financial support was provided by Fellowship for Woodrow Wilson Scholars and the Industrial Relations Section of Princeton University.
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.
AB - Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.
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U2 - 10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
DO - 10.1162/qjec.121.3.783
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:33746600682
SN - 0033-5533
VL - 121
SP - 783
EP - 821
JO - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JF - Quarterly Journal of Economics
IS - 3
ER -