@inproceedings{9b0cebfb21ef48649c99179b32622738,
title = "Parameter-hiding order revealing encryption",
abstract = "Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases which allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.",
keywords = "Encryption, Order-revealing encryption",
author = "David Cash and Liu, {Feng Hao} and Adam O{\textquoteright}Neill and Mark Zhandry and Cong Zhang",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, International Association for Cryptologic Research.; 24th Annual International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2018 ; Conference date: 02-12-2018 Through 06-12-2018",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-03326-2_7",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9783030033255",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "181--210",
editor = "Thomas Peyrin and Steven Galbraith",
booktitle = "Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2018 - 24th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings",
address = "Germany",
}