Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

314 Scopus citations

Abstract

There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)251-269
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1986

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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