Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu; David Pearce; Ennio Stacchetti

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1

Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

337 Scopus citations

Abstract

There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	251-269
Number of pages	19
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	39
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
State	Published - Jun 1986

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1

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title = "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring",

abstract = "There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.",

author = "Dilip Abreu and David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti",

note = "Funding Information: *This research was conducted mainly while the authors were visiting the Institute for Mathematics and its Applications of the University of Minnesota, and was supported by National Science Foundation Grant MCS 81-20789. We would like to acknowledge helpful conversations with Peter Doyle, Abraham Neyman, Rob Porter, and Hans Weinberger.",

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AU - Pearce, David

AU - Stacchetti, Ennio

N1 - Funding Information: *This research was conducted mainly while the authors were visiting the Institute for Mathematics and its Applications of the University of Minnesota, and was supported by National Science Foundation Grant MCS 81-20789. We would like to acknowledge helpful conversations with Peter Doyle, Abraham Neyman, Rob Porter, and Hans Weinberger.

PY - 1986/6

Y1 - 1986/6

N2 - There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

AB - There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

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Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Abstract

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