Consider a seller who seeks to provide service to a collection of interested parties, subject to feasibility constraints on which parties may be simultaneously served. Assuming that a distribution is known on the value of each party for service - arguably a strong assumption - Myerson's seminal work provides revenue optimizing auctions . We show instead that, for very general feasibility constraints, only knowledge of the median of each party's value distribution, or any other quantile of these distributions, or approximations thereof, suffice for designing simple auctions that simultaneously approximate both the optimal revenue and the optimal welfare. Our results apply to all downward-closed feasibility constraints under the assumption that the underlying, unknown value distributions are monotone hazard rate, and to all matroid feasibility constraints under the weaker assumption of regularity of the underlying distributions. Our results jointly generalize the single-item results obtained by Azar and Micali  on parametric auctions, and Daskalakis and Pierrakos  for simultaneously approximately optimal and efficient auctions.