Abstract
In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate view seems objectionably arbitrary. However, it is usually thought that anti-arbitrariness considerations on their own cannot decide between these maximalist or minimalist views. I will argue that this is a mistake. Anti-arbitrariness arguments may be used to motivate a certain popular thesis in the philosophy of mathematics that rules out the maximalist view in many different ontological debates.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 485-495 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
Keywords
- abstract objects
- arbitrariness
- indefinite extensibility
- modality
- ontology
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