On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Dilip Abreu; David G. Pearce

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(84)90168-6

On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Dilip Abreu, David G. Pearce

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	169-174
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90168-6
State	Published - Oct 1984

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(84)90168-6

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title = "On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games",

abstract = "The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.",

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On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Abstract

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