TY - GEN
T1 - On oblivious equilibrium in large population stochastic games
AU - Adlakha, Sachin
AU - Johari, Ramesh
AU - Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
AU - Goldsmith, Andrea
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We study stochastic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. A standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is well known that the computation of MPE suffers from the "curse of dimensionality." To deal with this complexity, several researchers have introduced the idea of oblivious equilibrium (OE). In OE, each player reacts to only the long-run average state of other players. In this paper, we study existence of OE, and also find conditions under which OE approximates MPE well.
AB - We study stochastic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. A standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is well known that the computation of MPE suffers from the "curse of dimensionality." To deal with this complexity, several researchers have introduced the idea of oblivious equilibrium (OE). In OE, each player reacts to only the long-run average state of other players. In this paper, we study existence of OE, and also find conditions under which OE approximates MPE well.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79953127460&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79953127460&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2010.5717048
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2010.5717048
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79953127460
SN - 9781424477456
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 3117
EP - 3124
BT - 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2010
Y2 - 15 December 2010 through 17 December 2010
ER -