Oblivious equilibrium: An approximation to large population dynamic games with concave utility

Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Weintraub, Andrea Goldsmith

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study stochastic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. A standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is well known that the computation of MPE suffers from the "curse of dimensionality." Recently an approximate solution concept called "oblivious equilibrium" (OE) was developed by Weintraub et. al, where each player reacts to only the average behavior of other players. In this work, we characterize a set of games in which OE approximates MPE. Specifically, we show that if system dynamics and payoff functions are concave in state and action and have decreasing differences in state and action, then an oblivious equilibrium of such a game approximates MPE. These exogenous conditions on model primitives allow us to characterize a set of games where OE can be used as an approximate solution concept.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages68-69
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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