Abstract
This chapter explains how norms influence mental state ascriptions by examining the relationship between prescriptive norms (moral and conventional) and ascriptions of intentional action. According to Joshua Knobe, there is an imbalance in judgments about whether morally good actions against bad side effects were done "intentionally," a phenomenon he dubbed as the side-effect effect. It looks at the two contrasting perspectives in response to the side-effect effect, the Intuitive Moralist view and the Biased Scientist view, and proposes a third approach, the "Rational Scientist". The chapter then presents studies testing the Rational Scientist as a conjecture about the relationship between moral evaluation and the theory of mind.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Experimental Philosophy |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Volume | 2 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780190267698 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199927418 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 16 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Biased scientist
- Intentional action
- Intuitive moralist
- Joshua knobe
- Mental states
- Moral evaluation
- Prescriptive norms
- Rational scientist
- Side-effect effect
- Theory of mind