Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect

Kevin Uttich, Tania Lombrozo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter explains how norms influence mental state ascriptions by examining the relationship between prescriptive norms (moral and conventional) and ascriptions of intentional action. According to Joshua Knobe, there is an imbalance in judgments about whether morally good actions against bad side effects were done "intentionally," a phenomenon he dubbed as the side-effect effect. It looks at the two contrasting perspectives in response to the side-effect effect, the Intuitive Moralist view and the Biased Scientist view, and proposes a third approach, the "Rational Scientist". The chapter then presents studies testing the Rational Scientist as a conjecture about the relationship between moral evaluation and the theory of mind.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationExperimental Philosophy
PublisherOxford University Press
Volume2
ISBN (Electronic)9780190267698
ISBN (Print)9780199927418
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 16 2014
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Keywords

  • Biased scientist
  • Intentional action
  • Intuitive moralist
  • Joshua knobe
  • Mental states
  • Moral evaluation
  • Prescriptive norms
  • Rational scientist
  • Side-effect effect
  • Theory of mind

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this