New models of cache architectures characterizing information leakage from cache side channels

Tianwei Zhang, Ruby Bei-Loh Lee

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Side-channel attacks try to breach confidentiality and retrieve critical secrets through the side channels. Cache memories are a potential source of information leakage through side-channel attacks, many of which have been proposed. Meanwhile, different cache architectures have also been proposed to defend against these attacks. However, there are currently no means for comparing and evaluating the effectiveness of different defense solutions against these attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method to evaluate a system s vulnerability to side-channel attacks. We establish side-channel leakage models based on the non-interference property. Then we define how the security aspects of a cache architecture can be modeled as a finite-state machine (FSM) with state transitions that cause interference. We use mutual information to quantitatively reveal potential side-channel leakage of the architectures, and allow comparison of these architectures for their relative vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks. We use real attacks to validate our results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages96-105
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 8 2014
Event30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2014 - New Orleans, United States
Duration: Dec 8 2014Dec 12 2014

Other

Other30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2014
CountryUnited States
CityNew Orleans
Period12/8/1412/12/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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    Zhang, T., & Lee, R. B-L. (2014). New models of cache architectures characterizing information leakage from cache side channels. 96-105. Paper presented at 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2014, New Orleans, United States. https://doi.org/10.1145/2664243.2664273