TY - JOUR
T1 - Network games
AU - Galeotti, Andrea
AU - Goyal, Sanjeev
AU - Jackson, Matthew O.
AU - Vega-Redondo, Fernando
AU - Yariv, Leeat
N1 - Funding Information:
Finally, to prove the result for the case of strategic substitutes, note that the above line of arguments can be applied unchanged, with the suitable adaptation of the partial order used to define monotonicity. In this second case, as explained in Section 6, we say that t ≽ t′ if and only if k ≥ k′ and ℓu ≤ ℓu′ for all u = 1, 2,.. . , k′. ‖ Acknowledgements. We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for useful suggestions. We are also grateful to Willemien Kets and a number of seminar audiences for comments which significantly improved the quality and broadened the scope of the paper. Jackson gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavior Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation and the NSF under grant SES-0647867. Vega-Redondo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education under grant SEJ2007-62656.
PY - 2010/1
Y1 - 2010/1
N2 - In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.
AB - In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00570.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:73149104832
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 77
SP - 218
EP - 244
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
IS - 1
ER -