Nash-MFG equilibrium in a SIR model with time dependent newborn vaccination

Emma Hubert, Gabriel Turinici

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the newborn, non compulsory, vaccination in a SIR model with vital dynamics. The evolution of each individual is modeled as a Markov chain. His/Her vaccination decision optimizes a criterion depending on the time-dependent aggregate (societal) vaccination rate and the future epidemic dynamics. We prove the existence of a Nash-Mean Field Games equilibrium among all individuals in the population. Then we propose a novel numerical approach to find the equilibrium and test it numerically.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)227-246
Number of pages20
JournalRicerche di Matematica
Volume67
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2018
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

Keywords

  • Individual vaccination
  • Mean Field Games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • SIR model
  • Vaccination
  • Vaccination efficacy
  • Vaccination games

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