Abstract
We study the newborn, non compulsory, vaccination in a SIR model with vital dynamics. The evolution of each individual is modeled as a Markov chain. His/Her vaccination decision optimizes a criterion depending on the time-dependent aggregate (societal) vaccination rate and the future epidemic dynamics. We prove the existence of a Nash-Mean Field Games equilibrium among all individuals in the population. Then we propose a novel numerical approach to find the equilibrium and test it numerically.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 227-246 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Ricerche di Matematica |
Volume | 67 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 1 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Mathematics
- Applied Mathematics
Keywords
- Individual vaccination
- Mean Field Games
- Nash equilibrium
- SIR model
- Vaccination
- Vaccination efficacy
- Vaccination games