TY - JOUR
T1 - Multitasking versus multiplexing
T2 - Toward a normative account of limitations in the simultaneous execution of control-demanding behaviors
AU - Feng, S. F.
AU - Schwemmer, M.
AU - Gershman, S. J.
AU - Cohen, Jonathan D.
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank the following individuals for useful discussions, suggestions, and assistance in pursuing the work presented in this article: Matt Botvinick, Todd Braver, Chris Honey, Phil Holmes, Konrad Koerding, Rick Lewis, Jay McClelland, David Meyer, Michael Mozer, Yuko Munakata, Leigh Nystrom, Randy O’Reilly, Satinder Singh (Baveja), and Marius Usher. This work was supported by contributions from the NIH (Grant No. T32MH065214 to M.S. and S.F.F.), the NSF Graduate Fellowship Program (to S.J.G.), AFOSR Grant No. MURI FA9550-07-1-0537 (to S.F.F. and J.D.C.), and the John Templeton Foundation (to J.D.C.). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
PY - 2014/3
Y1 - 2014/3
N2 - Why is it that behaviors that rely on control, so striking in their diversity and flexibility, are also subject to such striking limitations? Typically, people cannot engage in more than a few - and usually only a single - control-demanding task at a time. This limitation was a defining element in the earliest conceptualizations of controlled processing; it remains one of the most widely accepted axioms of cognitive psychology, and is even the basis for some laws (e.g., against the use of mobile devices while driving). Remarkably, however, the source of this limitation is still not understood. Here, we examine one potential source of this limitation, in terms of a trade-off between the flexibility and efficiency of representation ("multiplexing") and the simultaneous engagement of different processing pathways (" multitasking"). We show that even a modest amount of multiplexing rapidly introduces cross-talk among processing pathways, thereby constraining the number that can be productively engaged at once. We propose that, given the large number of advantages of efficient coding, the human brain has favored this over the capacity for multitasking of control-demanding processes.
AB - Why is it that behaviors that rely on control, so striking in their diversity and flexibility, are also subject to such striking limitations? Typically, people cannot engage in more than a few - and usually only a single - control-demanding task at a time. This limitation was a defining element in the earliest conceptualizations of controlled processing; it remains one of the most widely accepted axioms of cognitive psychology, and is even the basis for some laws (e.g., against the use of mobile devices while driving). Remarkably, however, the source of this limitation is still not understood. Here, we examine one potential source of this limitation, in terms of a trade-off between the flexibility and efficiency of representation ("multiplexing") and the simultaneous engagement of different processing pathways (" multitasking"). We show that even a modest amount of multiplexing rapidly introduces cross-talk among processing pathways, thereby constraining the number that can be productively engaged at once. We propose that, given the large number of advantages of efficient coding, the human brain has favored this over the capacity for multitasking of control-demanding processes.
KW - Capacity constraint
KW - Computational model
KW - Decision-making
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U2 - 10.3758/s13415-013-0236-9
DO - 10.3758/s13415-013-0236-9
M3 - Article
C2 - 24481850
AN - SCOPUS:84897558913
SN - 1530-7026
VL - 14
SP - 129
EP - 146
JO - Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience
JF - Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience
IS - 1
ER -