TY - JOUR
T1 - Motivated to learn
T2 - An account of explanatory satisfaction
AU - Liquin, Emily G.
AU - Lombrozo, Tania
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Casey Lewry for coding a subset of the recalled explanations from Study 3. We would also like to thank Diana Tamir, Tom Griffiths, and members of the Concepts and Cognition Lab for their useful feedback on this work. Some of the results reported here were presented at the 2019 meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, and we are grateful to these audiences for their discussion and feedback. In addition, subsets of this work were submitted in partial fulfillment of EL’s dissertation requirement at Princeton University. This work was supported by research funds awarded to TL by Princeton University, as well as an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship to EL [grant number DGE-1656466]. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science.
Funding Information:
We thank Casey Lewry for coding a subset of the recalled explanations from Study 3. We would also like to thank Diana Tamir, Tom Griffiths, and members of the Concepts and Cognition Lab for their useful feedback on this work. Some of the results reported here were presented at the 2019 meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, and we are grateful to these audiences for their discussion and feedback. In addition, subsets of this work were submitted in partial fulfillment of EL's dissertation requirement at Princeton University. This work was supported by research funds awarded to TL by Princeton University, as well as an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship to EL [grant number DGE-1656466]. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Authors
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.
AB - Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.
KW - Explanation
KW - Information search
KW - Inquiry
KW - Learning
KW - Satisfaction
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85120469046&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85120469046&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453
DO - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2021.101453
M3 - Article
C2 - 34875484
AN - SCOPUS:85120469046
SN - 0010-0285
VL - 132
JO - Cognitive Psychology
JF - Cognitive Psychology
M1 - 101453
ER -