Abstract
We argue that a model of judicial behavior that accounts for differences in justices' ability and ideology provides a fruitful alternative for the empirical analysis of judicial decision-making around the world, and illustrate this by focusing on the case of the United Kingdom. We show that the model explains the decisions of the Lords of Appeal remarkably well, and improves the fit of a purely ideological model. We use our estimates to tackle previously unaddressed questions about the relative role of justices' preferences and ability in the Appellate Committee. (JEL C11, C13, D71, K40.)
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 61-93 |
Number of pages | 33 |
Journal | Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1 2016 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Law