Moral perception and its rivals

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEvaluative Perception
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages161-182
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9780198786054
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities

Keywords

  • Inference
  • Moral epistemology
  • Moral experience
  • Moral knowledge
  • Moral perception

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