Moral Knowledge and Experience

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

14 Scopus citations


This chapter explores how one might attempt to reconcile two widely held ideas about morality that stand in prima facie tension with one another. The first idea is that moral knowledge - whatever else is true of it and even whether it exists at all - is not empirical knowledge. If there are moral truths, then the most fundamental of those truths are, like the truths of pure mathematics, available from the armchair. The second idea is that lack of experience can be a handicap in the acquisition of moral knowledge, and that experience of the world often proves crucial in its attainment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Metaethics
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191729478
ISBN (Print)9780199606375
StatePublished - Jun 30 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Arts and Humanities


  • A priori knowledge
  • Experience
  • Moral knowledge
  • Moral truth
  • Morality


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