Abstract
This chapter proposes a conception of Practical Ethics which ties what epistemically limited agents are to do on some occasion not only to limits on their non-evaluative information about how much intrinsic value would result from various actions, but also to epistemic limits on their evaluative information about what has intrinsic value. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section spells out Moore's view of the way in which uncertainty affects the proposed definition of rightness in terms of the maximization of value. The second section compares Moore's view with an alternative put forward more recently by Frank Jackson (1991). The third and fourth sections present the author's own account and say why it should be preferred to both Moore's and Jackson's views. To anticipate, it turns out that Moore and Jackson are both right about something and wrong about something. The correct view combines elements from both.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Metaethics after Moore |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191710032 |
ISBN (Print) | 0199269912, 9780199269914 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 26 2006 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Frank jackson
- Moore
- Practical ethics
- Rightness
- Uncertainty